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Article 6

Redeeming the
Aural: Amodal
Resonance and
Media History
Ian Mason Kennedy
Sounding New Media: Immersion
and Embodiment in the Arts
and Culture by Frances Dyson.
Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2009. Pp. 262. $60.00 cloth,
$28.95 paper.

In tracing the hitherto overlooked
influence of sound on the theory
and practice of new media art,
Frances Dyson’s Sounding New
Media offers a productive point of
entry into historicizing 1990s cyberculture and the newness of new
media. Dyson’s central argument is
twofold. First, Dyson claims that
the features that supposedly mark
new media as new—qualities such
as tactile interactivity and total
sensory immersion—have roots in
older, predominantly sonic media
(e.g., radio, telephone, and early
electroacoustic sound art). In developing this first claim, Dyson argues
additionally that “sound is simultaneously neglected and appropriated
by the rhetorics of immersion and
embodiment that have inaugurated
new media discourse and have announced new media as ‘new’” (6).
That is, for Dyson, the rhetorical
frameworks through which we
make sense of sound—the distinction between original sound and
recorded sound, for instance, or
between signal and noise—have
quietly and tacitly laid the groundwork for the visual and tactile
tropes we tend to use when we talk
about digital media. At stake, then,
is the redemption of the aural in a
regime that only seems to be dominated by other sense modalities.
Although Sounding New Media
offers a compelling impressive
account of new media, the book
has greater consequences for what
has become a central problem for
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scholarship on audiovisual media
in general—namely, the relationship between the modal and the
amodal. By modal, I mean the idea
that sensory experience differentiates into discrete modalities: sight,
sound, touch, smell, and so on. In
contrast, to describe sensation as
amodal is to emphasize how any
given perceptual event cannot be
reduced to just one modality. When
a car speeds by me, for instance, I
not only hear and see the car but
also feel a rush of air and a slight
rumble. In cinema and media studies, the following questions arise:
How do media such as the cinema
and television use sight and sound
to evoke sensations that resonate in
the human body amodally, beyond
merely the visual and sonic modalities? And, for that matter, how can
we identify ourselves as scholars in
one modality—musicology, sound
studies, visual culture, and so on—
while doing justice to the richness and complexity of resonance
among multiple modalities? Dyson
answers these questions by using
a sonic figure: the embodied voice.
The dominant tendency in cinema
and media studies, however, has
been to answer in another register:
that of touch.
The aspect of touch that has
done the most theoretical work is
the reflexivity of self-touching—in
particular, the experience of touching one’s left hand with one’s right
hand. Especially in film theory,
scholars such as Jennifer Barker

and Vivian Sobchack have taken
this figure from Maurice MerleauPonty, who uses it to describe the
fundamental reversibility of subject and object in perception. For
example, for Barker, just as I may
reverse between being in my left
hand touching the right hand and
in my right hand touching the left,
so, in the cinema, may I reverse between being in my body and being
in the counterfactual world of the
film.1 The amodal is central to this
discussion in that tactile structures
come to underpin all other sense
modalities; the tactile is posited as
the reversibility from which all
other modes of reversibility derive.
This bias toward the tactile—and
an attendant denigration of the visual—is less ingrained in the field
of media studies, in which Dyson
is writing, than it is in the narrower field of cinema studies. It is,
however, present, and is best exemplified by media theorist Mark
B. N. Hansen’s concept of “primary tactility,” which he develops
in Bodies in Code (2006). Tactility
is primary or originary for Hansen in that other modalities, such
as vision, need something outside
the body—a “technical artifact,”
such as a mirror—to produce the
kind of specular, reflexive relation
(seeing oneself seeing-oneself) that
self-touching has from the start,
without such an exteriorization
or artifact.2 Hansen invokes Jean
Laplanche and Didier Anzieu to
argue productively that we should
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understand this derivation of vision
from touch in terms of anaclisis—a
psychoanalytic term for the way in
which psychic processes are at first
synonymous with, but eventually
detach from, biological processes.
Hansen generalizes anaclisis, arguing that it underpins not only the
individual psyche but also the human’s relation to technology: anaclisis becomes the name for how
amodal structures (originally tactile ones, for Hansen) detach from
one sense modality and move to
another with the support of a technical exteriorization, as when the
mirror exteriorizes the reflexivity
of touch and extends it to vision.
Although Dyson never mentions the concept of anaclisis explicitly in Sounding New Media,
an important consequence of her
book is that it offers an alternative
account of anaclisis, technicity, and
the amodal—one that posits the
aural rather than the tactile as the
primary structure of the amodal.
Specifically, Dyson offers the figure of the autoaffective voice: the
reflexive, proprioceptive feeling of
oneself speaking (the resonance of
one’s voice inside one’s own ears,
chest cavity, and vocal cords). In
the first chapter, “Ethereal Transmissions,” Dyson looks at gestures
toward the voice in ancient Greek
metaphysics, Christian theology,
and Descartes, arguing that the reflexivity of speaking is the anaclitic
ground for the way these accounts
develop the metaphysical concept
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of the inner voice—the voice inside
one’s head, abstracted from all exteriority, and synonymous with
the amodal domain of thought. As
Dyson puts it,
Decontaminating the voice
has occupied Western metaphysics for millennia—a process that predates the voice’s
actual mechanical reproduction and transmission—and
can be roughly characterized
in three phases: first, removing air from the voice—the
voice becomes anaerobic;
second, removing temporal
and spatial presence—the
voice becomes anechoic; and
finally, removing sonority—
the voice becomes static and
silent. (20)
Whereas traditional metaphysics
holds that the silent, inner voice of
thought exists prior to, and extends
outward into, the phenomenal
world through the audible voice,
Dyson claims that the inverse is true.
For Dyson, the psychical process
of thinking of oneself-thinking—
Descartes’s cogito ergo sum, or “I
think, therefore I am”—actually
derives its reflexive structure anaclitically, from the bodily reflexivity
of feeling oneself-speaking. Anaclisis, however, involves not only the
derivation of psychical structures
from biological structures but also
(to use Dyson’s term) an eventual
“decontamination” or detachment
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of the psychical from the biological. That is, the inner voice derives
from the detachment of the embodied voice from the speaker’s
vocal cords, resonant bodily cavities, and breath (“the voice becomes
anaerobic”) and thus also from the
materiality of the acoustic world
(“the voice becomes anechoic”).
The figure of the inner voice, and
its anaclitic detachment from the
embodied voice, recurs throughout Sounding New Media. For instance, where Hansen argues that
the mirror and other visual media
extend the reflexivity of touch into
the visual modality, Dyson makes a
similar claim in the second chapter,
“Celestial Telegraphies”—namely,
that audio technologies such as the
telephone and radio technically extend the inner voice of metaphysics.
As Dyson puts it,
Electricity and technology
thus act as a conduit through
which the presence of the
voice, in its metaphysical
guise, can be reasserted.
The characteristics of inner
speech: that it is silent, atopic,
self-directed, and timeless
can easily be transferred to
the perception of the electronic voice, since both occur
in the absence, the here-andnow embodiment of the
speaker. (51)
For Dyson, the ability of telephone and radio to function despite

abstracting the voice from the body
and space-time of the speaker hinges
on the fact that the embodied voice
had already, centuries earlier, been
abstracted in another register: that
of thought, or the “inner speech” of
the metaphysical tradition. This is
to say that, just as Hansen’s mirror
exteriorizes in the visual modality the originary, primary reflexivity of self-touching—seeing-seen
exteriorizes touching-touched—so
does the telephonic or radiophonic
voice’s framing of signal and noise,
or message and medium, exteriorize the structure of the inner voice:
“By amplifying the volume of the
voice at close range, rendering inaudible any extraneous sound, and
concealing as much as possible the
presence of the technology, the
broadcast voice echoes the autoaffective circuit of its metaphysical
corollary” (53). That is, the closerange radio (or telephone) microphone picks up the speaker’s voice
while filtering out the sonic background, just as metaphysics picks
up the inner voice while filtering
out the extraneous sound of its resonance in the speaker’s body.
It is important to emphasize,
however, that Dyson’s claims
about embodiment and technical
exteriorization involve a different
methodology than Hansen’s. Hansen poses his object of inquiry as a
problem for phenomenology, while
Dyson approaches hers primarily as
a rhetorical problem. That is, Hansen seeks to describe encounters
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with new media from the inside,
as it were, in terms of embodied
experience, whereas Dyson sets out
to analyze encounters with new
media from the outside, to unpack
and historicize the discourse and
rhetoric around them. In this respect, Dyson retains the methodological orientation of what might
be called the “second wave” of
sound studies in the humanities.
The first wave of sound studies—
exemplified by work in the 1980s
and early 1990s, from film and
media scholars such as John Belton,
Alan Williams, Rick Altman, and
Tom Levin—takes the approach
of ideology critique, arguing that
successful sound reproduction boils
down to deception: the listener
is deceived into experiencing the
audio recording as identical with
the original sound event.3
In contrast, scholars writing
in the second wave—James Lastra, Jonathan Sterne, and Emily
Thompson, among others writing
in the early 2000s—aspire not to
criticize the perceived identity between original and copy, but rather
to look at the historical and cultural
conditions that make the original/
copy distinction possible in the first
place. In The Audible Past (2003),
for instance, Sterne argues that
what is at stake is not an ontological disjuncture between a recorded
sound and an original sound, but
rather how listeners put their “faith
in the social function and organization of machines” through the
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practice of what Sterne calls “audile
technique.”4 For example, in order
to feel a sense of participation in the
telephone network, users practice a
kind of culturally learned listening
technique: they attend to the voice
while ignoring the noise of the telephone line—just as the vinyl fetishist places his or her faith in the
machine by attending to the music
while ignoring the crackles and
pops of vinyl, or the physician by
attending to the patient’s heartbeat
while tuning out the the stethoscope
tube’s constant hum. Although
Dyson herself (unconvincingly) denies it, there is a striking resonance,
here, between Sterne’s examples of
audile technique and Dyson’s claim
that audio technologies filter out
noise from signal while technically
extending the way in which metaphysics filters out the embodied
voice from the inner voice (77–80).
That is, for both Sterne and Dyson
(and for Lastra and Thompson,
as well), listeners have not been
deceived into conflating recorded
sound and original sound so much
as they have inherited culturally ingrained techniques for attending to
certain aspects of sound and ignoring other aspects.
Dyson moves beyond this
second-wave approach, however,
in that she offers a sustained account of how the rhetoric of audio
fidelity has had an impact outside
the history of sound media, and
on 1990s new media art in particular. In the third chapter, “Aural
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Objects and Recording Devices,”
Dyson impressively traces this lineage back to the sound art of the
1950s and 1960s, devoting most of
her attention to the work of Pierre
Schaeffer and John Cage. Regarding the former, Dyson focuses on
Schaeffer’s concepts of acousmatic
listening and the sound object.
Acousmatic listening names a mode
of listening in which the listener
experiences a sound on its own
terms, without reference to a visible sound source, while the sound
object refers to the kind of sound
Schaeffer prescribes for acousmatic
listening. Similar to the telephonic
or radiophonic voice, Schaeffer’s
sound object inherits the anechoic
status of the inner voice, in that it
is detached (through audio recording) from any real-world acoustic
context. The other defining characteristic of the sound object is that
it becomes a repeatable, enduring
object in being recorded, and stored
for future playback, on the (at the
time) new medium of magnetic
tape. The upshot for Dyson is that
Schaeffer “reaches into aurality and
the unknowable reality it represents
and transforms it into a phenomenon that can be known through a
prosthetic ear” (58). That is, Schaeffer aspires to extend the enduring
objecthood and epistemological
clarity traditionally associated with
visual objects (e.g., I know that I
have seen the same house today
that I saw yesterday) to the more
ephemeral, more fluid (and for

that reason unknowable) identity
of sounds. For Dyson, Schaeffer
thus prefigures the 1990s discourse
around the posthuman and the cyborg by imagining a “prosthetic
ear” technically extended to function like an eye: recording and replaying an otherwise fleeting sound
event gives the listener the ability to
know that sound as an enduring object, as if technologically to extend
into the aural modality the certitude with which vision registers
physical objects as having a stable
identity over time.
According to Dyson, Schaeffer’s
concepts of prosthetic listening and
the sound object inherit the inner
voice’s metaphysical framework
insofar as they valorize the detachment of sounds from the ephemeral
space-time of real-world acoustics.
John Cage’s investment in silence
and radio does something similar for Dyson: it works within the
metaphysical framework laid out
by the inner voice, while looking
ahead toward the rhetoric of cyberspace and virtual environments.
Dyson claims that, in works such as
Imaginary Landscape No. 4 (1951)
for twelve radio receivers, radio is
amenable to Cage’s defamiliarization of silence since “the broadcast
signal, dependent on the workings
of an already existing technology,
can remain silent in the living silence of the yet-to-be-tuned airwaves . . . a silence whose presence
is actualized even when its sonorous
potential is not” (62). For Dyson,
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the figure of “yet-to-be tuned airwaves” enables Cage to argue for
a redefinition of silence, not as the
absence of sound, but instead as the
presence of vibrations (radio waves)
outside the range of what is humanly perceptible. Cage thus valorizes the figure of vibrations that
withdraw—like the inner voice
for metaphysics, or the nonspace
of networked computers for early
commentators on cyberculture—
into an amodal state below or to the
side of the phenomenal.
After tracing these neglected
sonic roots of 1990s cyberculture
in the first half of Sounding New
Media, Dyson finally moves to specific examples of sound-indebted
new-media art in the book’s final
three chapters. In the fifth chapter,
“Immersion,” for instance, Dyson
considers the work of artist Char
Davies, arguing that the importance
of sound to Davies’s immersive environment Osmose (1995) has been ignored in a way that is symptomatic
of Sounding New Media’s broader
thesis: that new-media art appropriates aspects of aurality but does so in
a way that conceals this indebtedness to sound. As evidence, Dyson
analyzes responses from participants
at the artwork’s premiere, as well as
Mark B. N. Hansen’s reading of the
artwork’s tactile aspect. For Dyson,
both the participant responses and
Hansen’s account understand Osmose to be foregrounding tactile
interactivity on the part of the user,
when actually the work foregrounds
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aural interactivity; more precisely,
both sets of evidence undervalue the
use of breathing, in its aural rather
than tactile aspect, as part of the
work’s navigational interface. Tactile
interactivity in virtual environments
emphasizes the sensation of moving
oneself through space, whereas, in Osmose, aural interactivity—regulating
one’s breathing, continuously attuning it to the interface—forces
the participant to maintain a kind
of awkward stillness. Dyson’s point
is that, in foregrounding aurality
and uncomfortable stillness rather
than tactility and seamless selfmovement, Davies “ruptur[es] the
fiction of the perfect body that virtual embodiment implies,” a “fiction” central to rhetoric around
cyberspace, virtual environments,
and the transcendence of the physical body (117). Dyson thus uses her
sound-oriented reading of Osmose
to historicize, and qualify, the lofty
rhetoric of cyberculture.
Indeed, similar to Sterne’s assertion that early audio technologies
functioned successfully because listeners put their “faith in the social
function and organization of machines,” Dyson argues that newmedia art of the 1990s elicited the
responses it did because participants put their faith—perhaps excessively so—in that art’s utopian
and transcendent potential. In the
sixth chapter, “Embodying Technology: From Sound Effect to
Body Effect,” Dyson develops an
argument introduced in the fifth
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chapter—namely, that participants
in new-media art events put their
faith in virtual environments—
which is to say, put their faith in the
newness of those new media environments—precisely by attending
to certain affective and proprioceptive sensations experienced in
those environments and ignoring
others, as if to rehearse in the proprioceptive modality the rhetorical
framework at work much earlier
in the case of audio fidelity. Similarly, in the seventh chapter, “Atmospheres,” Dyson looks at the
work of Catherine Richards, arguing that the latter’s use of old media
to reveal a long history of humans’
immersion in the electromagnetic
spectrum asks us to qualify even
further the newness of our more
recent immersion in cyberspace
and digitally constructed media environments. Despite a fourth chapter that feels out of place—a detour
through Heidegger that oversimplifies the latter’s notion of Stimmung and also distracts the reader
from the more focused media-historical lineage Dyson is attempting to trace—Sounding New Media
thus provides a productive, sobering criticism of the future-oriented
rhetoric around new media. Dyson
shows, that is, that to ignore the

quiet influence of the sonic on the
nonsonic is not only to overlook
the past, resulting in an incomplete
media history, but also (more crucially) to misconstrue the amodal
resonance of the present.
Ian Kennedy is a doctoral candidate in
Film and Media Studies in the English
Department at Wayne State University. His
dissertation addresses the role of sound in
traversing the relationship between sense
modalities and the amodal, and ultimately
traces an art-historical lineage of machinic
amodality—that is, the use of sound to translate affects that normally withdraw from the
scale of human experience.
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